THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM ON THE MIDDLE EAST
The United States and its allies have failed to dissuade Iran from pursuing its long-sought goal of attaining a nuclear weapons capability. Strong international pressure in October 2003 forced Iran to temporarily freeze its uranium enrichment operations and submit to increased inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Teheran's concessions staved off international sanctions and allowed them to engage the European Union through diplomatic negotiations. Teheran maintained a "charade" of sincerity during negotiations, effectively delaying progress until international opinion had shifted to its favor.
They now seem to believe that they are in a much stronger position due to the continued need for U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rising oil prices, increased bargaining leverage with oil imports, and its diplomatic cultivation of China's and Russia's influence with resolution brought before the United Nation Security Council. Iran's new president is firmly committed to Iran's nuclear program and remains determined to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle which would eventually give it fissionable material for nuclear weapons. chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them in our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war thought us that international laws are scarps of paper. With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made clear during the Iran-Iraq war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teaching of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolution and closes its eyes to the violation and all the aggression which are committed on the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. that it will be ten years before Iran has a nuclear bomb. 10 Accordingly, Iran has pursued three different methods of enriching uranium and has experimented with separating plutonium. This suggests a steady accrual of expertise in weapons-relevant areas. If Iran received the same nuclear weapon designs that A.Q. Khan gave Libya, the remaining technical hurdle (albeit the most difficult) would be fissionable material production. Therefore, the challenge is verifying that there are no undeclared enrichment facilities or capabilities. Most of Iran's effort in the enrichment area has been concentrated on centrifuge technology which Tehran is aggressively pursuing. The IAEA found that Iran repeatedly violated its safeguards agreement during an 18-year period of covert development and testing. Currently, Iran is operating a small centrifuge cascade and is conducting research and development work at a pilot facility in Natanz. This is the beginning of a much larger effort with hundreds of centrifuges at the pilot facility. Iran notified the IAEA that this fall it will begin installing the first of 3000 centrifuges at an industrial enrichment plant that is also at Natanz. Let there be no mistake that what Iran calls innocent research and development is actually the next step toward achieving a large-scale enrichment capability. Supporting this conclusion, Iran is now producing feedstock for centrifuges at a uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Iran has already produced approximately 85 tons of uranium hexafluoride at Isfahan. If this amount of feedstock were enriched in centrifuges to weapons grade material, the result would be enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for about 10 nuclear weapons. Nearby, Iran has dug an underground tunnel for storing uranium hexafluoride. The facility at Isfahan is also capable of converting uranium hexafluoride to uranium metal; the form used in nuclear weapons components. 11 In a recent CIA briefing before the Congress, U.S. lawmakers were told in closed session that Iran was not only involved in a clandestine nuclear program, but that the country is on a fast track to producing the final product. We, the Iranian people, within the border of our country, will cut off any hand that harms our scientific, natural, human or technological interests. We will cut off the hand that is sent to invade and work against our people's interests. We will do this with no hesitation … If the enemy had the audacity to harm and invade, our blows against it will not be limited to the borders of our country … If someone harms our people and invades, we will endanger his interests anywhere in the world. • Israel could prove its own nuclear power by exposing its arsenal. Israel may believe that this action would deter Iran by making clear that far more damage would be inflicted on Iran than Israel.
• Launching a preemptive military strike. This tactic worked in 1981 when Israel attacked Iraqi nuclear sites. The problem is that Iran learned from this and dispersed the location of its nuclear facilities. Furthermore many Iranian sites are hidden in the ground. Israel probably could degrade or delay parts of Iran's nuclear program, but it could not eliminate them.
• Israel could negotiate with Teheran as it did in the past. The problem is that the Iranians do not believe in the Israeli right to live in Israel and that the extreme Shia regime will not open the door for communications.
• To increase security cooperation with the United States. Israel will try to achieve a declaration from the U.S. of perilous consequences for Iran should it openly cross the nuclear threshold and use WMDs. This kind of declaration could allow Israel to maintain its own nuclear opaqueness without issuing warning of its own. This should include Israel requests for military aid, and especially ballistic missiles.
I think that Israel will wait until the last moment before it will act, however when Israel believes that this is our last chance, Israel will attack Iran, from the sea, in the air and with ballistic missiles.
The Gulf Countries
Iran is suspect in the greater Middle East and the GCC because of its efforts to export its The United
Arab Emirates are very concerned about Iranian ambitions and will try to arrange strategic arms agreement with the U.S.. This agreement will include all the systems that they need to protect their country. These two countries will do everything to restore their independence, including purchasing missiles from China.
• Creating or joining an existing nuclear umbrella could be a solution for the other Gulf countries; Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. It could be a strategic alliance with America, similar to the model of NATO. They will ensure the Americans receive oil, freedom of navigation and the option to deploy more troops in their countries. The Americans will guarantee their protection.
• A third option is that the GCC will not do anything and they will wait to see how the world reacts to an Iranian atomic bomb. This was part of their agenda when Iraq invaded to Kuwait. They may be happy to see an Israeli attack on Iran and even allow Israel to fly, or to use their territorial water.
Egypt
For many years Egypt was the leader and most powerful country in the Moslem world.
Iran's nuclear ambition and its extreme regime could cause Egypt to act in the following ways:
• Do nothing; Egypt will add its voice to those Arab countries calling for the region to be a nuclear free zone, to include Israel.
• Engage Iran as a diplomatic allays to solve this problem. They may try to be a bridge between the western countries and Iran.
• Acquire nuclear-armed weapons. President Mubarak declared that Egypt wants to build nuclear facilities for energy needs. It could be part of strategic plan that Egypt will have its own nuclear capabilities in the next decade.
Turkey
According to NATO Article V all members pledge that"an armed attack against them in Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 22 If the only areas of conflicting interest between Iran and the U.S. were threats posed to each others territory, deterrence alone might be sufficient.
We need to use all of the national elements of power:
Diplomatic
Iran's nuclear program presents difficult policy choices for all the players involved.
However we must try diplomacy first. This approach was adopted by the European Union, but for success it requires America to diplomatically engage the Iranian government. The U.S.
should try to use the discussions dealing with the stability in Iraq as an icebreaker for building relations with Iran. The U.S. must see Iran as political partners and offer incentives throughout the process such as; normalization between the countries, access to technology, and economic packages.
Economic
If diplomacy does not work, sanctions should be issued against Iran. The problem is that today, the United States is practically alone in this act. For success, these efforts need to affect Iran's economy. We need to enforce the sanctions outside the U.N. framework. Tehran is counting on Moscow's veto power. We need to build an economic coalition that will assure the sanctions work. Furthermore, this action could give us the opportunity to change the regime in
Teheran and support Iran's democratic opposition. Iran has a well educated group of young reformers who seek to replace the Ayatollah's regime with a democracy. The policy should include a public diplomacy campaign that will explain to the Iranian people how the regime's nuclear weapons program and hard line policies hurt their economic and national interests.
Intelligence
We need to improve intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons and other threats such as ballistic missiles, leadership, and strategic sites in the country. We need to collect more and better intelligence on a wide range of Iranian issues. This improvement would be especially valuable if it ultimately proves necessary to use military power as a last resort to defuse Iran's potential nuclear threat. The effort of intelligence must be a coalition effort, which should include: the U.S., Israel, NATO, the GCC.
Military
This must be the last option. From my perspective, the only country that could attack Iran, and to succeed is the U.S., or possibly with NATO as a coalition force. Before the attack, countries in the Middle East, especially Israel, must improve their defensive capabilities. The U.S. and Israel need to develop as their first priority the capability to destroy incoming missiles and warheads. Furthermore it is also essential to provide an umbrella for the forces that are in the theater. U.S. should pursue a mix of air, land, and sea-based missile defense system. To attack Iranian nuclear facilities, America and coalition partners must have a good plan, combined with special operation forces, and the ability to project power fast into the region. The strikes we must seek to kill the Iranian leadership to change the regime.
Conclusions
Iran is seeking a nuclear capability that would include weapons. It sees the benefits as prestige, legitimate regional status, and a greater voice in international relations. Iran has not paid the price for its failure to disclose its nuclear activities which were discovered in 2002. It is clear that their religious hierarchy is pursuing a robust nuclear weapons option. What remains obscure is what the Iranian's propose to do with the bomb once they have it. Iran is certainly not a responsible and compliant nation. I has not shown due regard to most of the obligations and disciplines linked to the handing and control of nuclear weapons. 23 Even if Iran could be deterred from considering attacks on Israel, "to wipe it from the map" in the words of Ahmanigad, an Iranian nuclear breakout would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Algeria building or acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Endnotes
